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WRONGFUL LIFE: THE TORT THAT NOBODY
WANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the cause of action known as wrongful life first
appeared less than twenty years ago,' it is still in its embry-
onic stage as evidenced by the fact that the legal community
has not yet agreed on a single definition of the claim.2 In this
comment, wrongful life refers to actions brought by a child
who asserts that he was brought into the world in an impaired
condition due to a medical practitioner's negligence. If the de-
fendant had not breached his duty, the child would not have
been born at all, nor doomed to a life of severe suffering.
Wrongful life actions should be contrasted with wrongful
birth actions, in which the child's parents claim that but for
the defendant's negligence they would not have conceived the
child, or they would have terminated the pregnancy had they
been informed of the risks to the child.' Even though many
state courts have recognized the wrongful birth cause of ac-
tion,5 only the California Supreme Court has recognized the
child's cause of action.6
This comment will focus on the reasons why most courts
refuse to recognize wrongful life. Included in this analysis will
be a discussion of the foundation and the development of
wrongful life and wrongful birth claims; the measure of dam-
0. 1983 by Camilla D. Cochran
1. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E. 2d 849 (1963).
2. Some commentators use the label wrongful life for actions brought by the
parents as well as those brought by the child. See Note, Wrongful Life: Birth Control
Spawns a Tort, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 401, 402 n.8 (1980). Other commentators use the
label to designate "[l]awsuits on behalf of or in the name of the child, based upon
such physician failures [such as failures to detect birth defects] . . . ." Peters & Pe-
tArs, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child's Right to a Cause of Action, 18
DuQ. L. REV. 857 (1980).
3. This definition is in accord with the one articulated in Curlender v. Bio-Sci-
ence Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 817, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 481 (1980).
4. The definition of wrongful birth as used in this comment is consistent with
the definition provided in Annot., 83 A.L.R. 3d 15 (1978).
5. Sixteen states permit recovery, in some form, to parents who can state a
claim for wrongful birth. Annot., 83 A.L.R. 3d (1978 and Supp. 1981).
6. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
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ages for the infant-plaintiff who seeks compensation for being
born; and the moral and philosophical questions with which
courts have wrestled in dealing with wrongful life. Finally, al-
ternatives and suggestions for overcoming the obstacles which
preclude recovery for the wrongful life claimant will be
offered.
II. THE FOUNDATION FOR WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL
BIRTH
Prior to Roe v. Wade, the decision legalizing abortion,
neither wrongful life nor wrongful birth were viewed as legiti-
mate causes of action. Parents would often claim that had the
defendant informed them that the child would be born defec-
tive, they would have terminated the pregnancy, and courts
felt that granting recovery would amount to tacit approval of
an illegal act.8
In Roe, the United States Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional a Texas statute prohibiting abortions. The Court rea-
soned that a fundamental component of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution is the right to
privacy,' which includes the right to choose whether to con-
ceive a child 0 or to terminate a pregnancy. The Court held
that a woman has an absolute right to an abortion during the
first trimester of her pregnancy.
The rights granted by the Court imply that parents may
make decisions about the quality of their unborn child's life.
Thus, the Roe v. Wade decision planted the seed from which
wrongful birth and wrongful life have grown: If parents may
make decisions about the quality of their child's life, then
they have a right to terminate a pregnancy which, if carried to
term, would result in the birth of a defective child. It follows
then that anyone who negligently deprives the parents of that
right should be held responsible for the natural consequences
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. This belief is verbalized in a concurring opinion in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967): "But, even if there were some state or foreign country
where an abortion for rubella were lawful, in the face of the present strong public
policy of New Jersey against such an abortion, no cause of action for damages should
be recognized in New Jersey .... " Id. at 48, 227 A.2d at 703 (Francis, J.,
concurring).
9. 410 U.S. at 154.
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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of his actions.
In addition to the stimulus provided by Roe v. Wade, re-
cent scientific developments have furthered the growth of
wrongful life and wrongful birth causes of action. Genetic
testing is often used to determine if parents, whose back-
grounds indicate the presence of genetic defects, have a high
probability of bearing a child with a hereditary defect. For ex-
ample Tay-Sachs disease is often found among persons of
Eastern European Jewish descent, and it may be diagnosed by
taking a blood sample from each prospective parent." In ad-
dition to genetic counseling, amniocentesis 2 and ultraso-
nography" procedures may be used during pregnancy to de-
tect defects in the unborn child. These techniques take the
"mystery" out of having a child because they provide a com-
plete picture of the unborn child, including whether or not
that child will be born with any abnormalities. Because of
these scientific advances, a mother who contracts rubella 4
during the first trimester of pregnancy may discover if that
disease has adversely affected the fetus; or the woman who
becomes pregnant after age thirty-five can be told if the child
will be born with Down's syndrome. 5
Without these technical devices which reveal defects in
the unborn child, neither wrongful life nor wrongful birth
would have achieved any recognition in the field of tort law.
The person who provides genetic counseling to would-be par-
ents or who performs techniques of determining birth defects
breaches his duty to the parents if he performs those tasks
negligently, and he should be liable to the foreseeable victims
of his actions.
The foundation for both wrongful birth and wrongful life
11. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 815, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 480 (1980) (citing J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
(1980)).
12. Amniocentesis is a procedure in which amniotic fluid is drawn from the in-
ner layer of tissue surrounding the fetus. 1 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE A-53 (1981).
13. Ultrasonography is a "method of outlining foreign bodies or deep structures
by using ultrasonic waves and tracing the resulting reflections and transmissions." 3
id. at U-7.
14. Rubella, or german measles, is a virus which "seems to affect the senses of
vision and hearing of the infant. Sometimes it affects the heart as well." Id. at R-89.
15. Down's syndrome or mongolism, is a "form of idiocy the physical features of
which are characterized by obliquely set eyes, open mouth, flabby muscles, soft skin,
broad face, etc." 2 id. at D-107.
19831 849
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was established by the United States Supreme Court in its
Roe v. Wade decision and by the scientific community's dis-
covery of techniques capable of detecting defects, both poten-
tial and real, in an unborn child. Although this foundation
seems equally strong for both claims, the courts have built
upon it in a piecemeal fashion, permitting recovery for wrong-
ful birth but denying recovery to the person upon whom the
injury was actually inflicted.
III. THE HISTORY OF WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTIONS
As stated earlier a wrongful birth action is one brought by
the parents of a child born with birth defects, claiming that if
they had been informed of the risks they would not have con-
ceived a child or they would have terminated the pregnancy.
The first case in which this claim was asserted was Gleitman
v. Cosgrove." In this 1967 case the mother contracted rubella
during the first trimester of pregnancy and the defendant
physician failed to diagnose the illness or to warn the mother
of the risks of damage to the child.17 As a result of the rubella
the child was born with severe birth defects. In denying the
parents' claim for wrongful birth, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that public policy precluded recovery: 8
The sanctity of the single human life is the decisive factor
in this suit at tort. We are not talking here about the
breeding of prize cattle. It may have been easier for the
mother and less expensive for the father to have termi-
nated the life of the child while he was an embryo, but
these alleged detriments cannot stand against the
preciousness of the single human life to support a remedy
in tort.1'
Although the Gleitman court ruled that there were no dam-
ages cognizable at law, it reversed itself in 1979 with the case
of Berman v. Allen.2 0 Mrs. Berman became pregnant at age
thirty-eight and bore a child afflicted with Down's syndrome.
She stated that amniocentesis should have been performed, in
16. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
17. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
18. When this decision was delivered New Jersey did not permit abortions. This
fact was influential in the court's ruling. See supra note 8. The court also rejected a
wrongful life claim. 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 692.
19. 49 N.J. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
20. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
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which case she would have terminated the pregnancy.2 1 The
parents sued for damages for the medical expenses and costs
of rearing the child as well as for damages for emotional
anguish.2 2 The court awarded damages only for the parents'
emotional anguish and denied the other requests because to
do so would grant the parents the benefits of the child's love
and companionship while relieving them of the responsibility
of providing for the child.23 Thus, the New Jersey court, while
recognizing the parents' right to recover, still struggled with
the sanctity of human life argument.
Other courts that recognize wrongful birth actions have
not limited recovery to emotional distress damages. The
Texas Supreme Court dismissed the Gleitman sanctity of life
argument in the case of Jacobs v. Theimer2 4 and ruled that all
expenses reasonably necessary for the child's care and treat-
ment were recoverable. 5 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court awarded emotional distress and costs of care damages
to the parents of a child afflicted with neurofibromatosis, 6
stating that "since the parents have suffered a substantial
wrong, an action should be permitted in which the usual com-
mon law principles of damage should be applied. '2 7
The California courts recognized the wrongful birth cause
of action in 1967, long before most other state courts, in Cus-
todio v. Bauer.2 8 While other courts grappled with the sanc-
tity of life argument and the policy of preferring birth over
abortion, the Custodio court analyzed wrongful birth as it
would any other tort claim and found that a doctor who failed
to use due care is liable for the injuries he inflicted.29
The issue in Custodio was the birth of an unwanted child,
not a deformed one. Although most courts will grant relief to
the parents of a deformed child, court decisions lack uniform-
ity concerning relief available to the parents of a healthy, but
21. Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
22. Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 13.
23. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
24. 519 S.W.2d 846 (1975).
25. Id. at 850.
26. Neurofibromatosis is a condition characterized by "tumor[s] arising from
the connective or supporting tissue of a nerve." 2 J. SCHMIDT, supra note 12, at N-39.
27. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's ruling in Speck v.
Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
28. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
29. Id. at 312, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
1983]
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unwanted child. In Terrell v. Garcia,3" a Texas court refused
to award damages to a mother who had undergone an unsuc-
cessful tubal ligation and later gave birth to her fourth and
unwanted child. The court reasoned that the benefits the par-
ents would gain due to the child's birth outweighed any eco-
nomic loss the parents may have suffered as a consequence of
raising him.31 A Michigan court, however, held that the
mother's lost earnings, medical and hospital expenses, dam-
ages for the pain and suffering of labor and childbirth, and
the economic costs of rearing the child were recoverable.2
This court recognized that although the parents would receive
the benefit of the child's love and affection, to place a dollar
value on that benefit would be equivalent to holding "that in
every case, as a matter of law, the services and companionship
of a child have a dollar equivalent greater than the economic
costs of support, to say nothing of the inhibitions, the restric-
tions, and the pain and suffering caused by pregnancy and the
obligation to rear the child."3 The court was unwilling to go
this far.
Although wrongful life and wrongful birth actions arise
from the same set of facts, wrongful life has yet to achieve the
recognition or acceptance of its sister claim. The public policy
arguments first articulated in Gleitman no longer bar recovery
for wrongful birth, but present a major obstacle in wrongful
life actions. These arguments, which will be discussed more
fully in a subsequent section, are indicative of the inconsis-
tency in the judicial decisions which uphold the parents'
rights on the one hand while denying the child's rights on the
other.
IV. INJURIES FROM WHICH WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIMS ARISE
With the exception of California, all other state courts
claim that damages cannot be granted to the infant-plaintiff
because damages cannot be measured and the court is not ca-
pable of accepting that in some situations no life is better
than any life.34 Wrongful life claims arise under a number of
30. 496 S.W.2d 124 (1973).
31. Id. at 128.
32. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260-62, 187 N.W.2d 511, 521 (1970).
33. Id. at 250, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
34. See, e.g., Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 22, 227 A.2d at 692.
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different factual situations. There are three categories within
wrongful life, and a brief discussion of each category will as-
sist in a better understanding of this claim and the reason for
its harsh treatment by the courts.
A. Illegitimacy
In this category, the injury with which the child has been
afflicted is the social stigma of being born an illegitimate. In
the leading case of Zepeda v. Zepeda,6 the child claimed that
his father had been negligent in refusing to marry the child's
mother. Although the court recognized that a "a tortious act
against the individual""6 had been committed, it denied recov-
ery because recognition of the infant-plaintiff's claim would
encourage a host of insubstantial claims.
In Williams v. State of New York"5 a child was born out
of wedlock to a mentally deficient mother who was raped
while under the care of a state institution. The child claimed
that she was deprived of property rights, a normal childhood
and home life, proper parental care, and would bear the
stigma of illegitimacy all her life. 9 The New York Court of
Appeals ruled against the infant-plaintiff on the grounds that,
"the law knows no cure for [illegitimacy], and the policy and
social reasons against providing such compensation are at
least as strong as those which might be thought to favor it. '" 4 0
In the California case of Stills v. Gratton,41 the infant-
plaintiff's mother underwent a therapeutic abortion 42 which
was performed negligently and the mother later gave birth to
a healthy boy. In denying recovery, the court emphasized the
fact that no harm was done since the child was healthy and a
35. 41 11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
36. Id. at 253, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
37. Id. "One might seek damages for being born of a certain color, another be-
cause of race; one for being born with a hereditary disease, another for inheriting
unfortunate family characteristics." Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858. The court did not
address the constitutional issues of due process and equal protection raised by the
infant-plaintiff. Id. at 246, 190 N.E. 2d at 853.
38. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343 (1966).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 481, 223 N.E.2d at 344.
41. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976).
42. A therapeutic abortion is one performed to save the mother's life. 1 J.
SCHMIDT, supra note 12, at A-17.
1983]
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joy to its mother.4"
It is doubtful that an illegitimate's wrongful life action
will be recognized in the absence of a physical injury of a bet-
ter definition of the harm of the alleged stigma.
The unfair treatment to which illegitimates have been subject
in the past is diminishing in today's society. The United
States Supreme Court articulated a more current attitude to-
wards illegitimates: "It is unfair and unjust for society to ex-
press its condemnation of procreation outside the marital re-
lationship by punishing the illegitimate child who is in no way
responsible for his situation and is unable to change it.""
B. Pre-Conception Injuries
1. Negligent Treatment
This category involves claims that tortious conduct upon
a parent prior to conception resulted in injuries to the child.
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital45 the mother had been
given a transfusion when she was thirteen, of Rh + blood type
which was incompatible with her Rh- blood type. The error
was not discovered until the mother became pregnant and
bore a daughter afflicted with both brain and nervous system
damages.46 The Illinois court ruled that the harm to the child
was foreseeable so the hospital owed a duty of care to the un-
born child. 7
While Renslow does not technically fall under the wrong-
ful life heading because the child did not assert that but for
the defendant's negligence she would not have been born, it is
nonetheless important to an analysis of wrongful life because
it establishes the physician's duty of care to the unborn child.
In wrongful life actions based on negligent sterilization opera-
tions, however, the issue is the measure of damages rather
than the duty of care.
In this group of cases, one of the parents has undergone a
sterilization operation, which, because it was negligently per-
43. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
44. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352 (1979), quoted in Note, Equal Protec-
tion for Illegitimate Children: A Consistent Analysis Emerges, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rav.
142, 163.
45. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
46. Id. at 348, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
47. Id. at 360, 367 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
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formed, did not prevent the birth of a child. For example in
the tragic case of Speck v. Finegold,48 Mr. Speck suffered
from neurofibromatosis and he and his wife, after having two
children who also suffered from this hereditary disease, de-
cided that he should have a vasectomy. Despite the vasec-
tomy, Mrs. Speck became pregnant so an abortion was per-
formed, which turned out to be unsuccessful. Although the
parents went to great lengths to prevent the birth of a child, a
daughter was born who suffered from neurofibromatosis.49
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was evenly divided 0 on the
issue of whether the child, as well as the parents, had a right
to recover for the injuries she suffered:
Where an existing infant experiences suffering and
financial expense as a result of another's negligence, that
suffering and expense should be recompensed .... The
view that we cannot calculate the value of existence as
compared to nonexistence is only one such hyper-scholas-
tic rationale used to deny a cause of action in these
cases.
51
2. Genetic Counseling
Cases which fall into the category of genetic counseling
usually involve the following fact situation: Parents, aware
that they may be carriers of hereditary defects, undergo tests
to determine if in fact they are carriers; after assurances from
the physician or genetic testing facility that they will not bear
a child afflicted with a hereditary defect, they conceive and
subsequently give birth to a child born with the very defect
they sought to prevent.
Park v. Chessin5 2 is a typical case: The parents conceived
a child after doctors expressly informed them that there was
minimal risk the child would be born with polycystic kidney
48. 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981). See also Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546
(1978).
49. 497 Pa. at 82, 439 A.2d at 115.
50. Justices Flaherty, Kauffman, and Larsen argued for the child's wrongful life
claim. Justices Roberts and O'Brien stated that the child had no basis for recovery.
Justice Nix stated that not only should the child's claim be denied, but the parents'
wrongful birth claim should be rejected. Id. at 77, 439 A.2d at 110.
51. Id. at 87, 439 A.2d at 115 (Flaherty, J., concurring in affirmance of parents'
cause of action in tort and supporting affirmance of the order of the superior court
denying a cause of action to the infant plaintiff).
52. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978) (Park v. Chessin
is the companion case to Becker v. Schwartz).
1983]
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disease." Although a lower court permitted the diseased in-
fant to state a claim for wrongful life,5' the New York Court
of Appeals reversed, citing two flaws in the claim: (1) "[I]t
does not appear that the [infant] suffered any legally cogniza-
ble injury;" and (2) damages could not be ascertained."'
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories" is the landmark
case in the area of wrongful life. In this case, the court of ap-
peal established a child's right to state a cause of action for
wrongful life. Shauna Curlender was born with Tay-Sachs dis-
ease and she sought to recover damages from the defendants"
because genetic tests were performed negligently on her par-
ents.56 After a thorough discussion of decisions rejecting the
wrongful life claim, the court of appeal recognized Shauna's
right to recover:
The reality of the "wrongful-life" concept is that such a
plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of
others. It is neither necessary nor just to retreat into
meditation on the mysteries of life. We need not be con-
cerned with the fact that had defendants not been negli-
gent, the plaintiff might not have come into existence at
all. The certainty of genetic impairment is no longer a
mystery. In addition, a reverent appreciation of life com-
pels recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she may
be, has come into existence as a living person with certain
rights."
In 1982, the California Supreme Court, in Turpin v. Sor-
tini,60 agreed with the Curlender court and declared that a
cause of action for wrongful life may be stated. In Turpin, the
parents suspected that their daughter, the older sister of the
plaintiff, was afflicted with a severe hearing impairment, but
were incorrectly assured by their physician that the child's
hearing was within normal limits. In reliance on those assur-
53. Id. at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809. Polycystic kidney disease is one where many
cysts become imbedded in the tissue of the kidney. 2 J. SCHMIDT, supra note 12, at P-
214.
54. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
55. 46 N.Y.2d 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812.
56. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
57. The defendants in this case were Bio-Science Laboratories, Automated Lab-
oratory Services, and Jerome Schaffer, M.D. Id. at 814, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
58. Id. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
59. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
60. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
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ances the Turpins conceived a second child, Joy, who was
born with hereditary total deafness. 1 Although the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal rejected Curlender because it believed
that decision did not adequately address the public policy
problems which a wrongful life claim presents, and asserted
that the legislature, not the judiciary, should decide this is-
sue, the Supreme Court dismissed this argument.2
C. Injuries Occurring After Conception
Within this category are two subclasses: (1) the defend-
ant's failure to correctly diagnose an illness contracted by the
mother during the first trimester of pregnancy; and (2) the
defendant's failure to perform amniocentesis, or, if performed,
to correctly interpret the results.
In the first subclass the typical fact pattern is that the
mother contracted rubella during the first trimester of preg-
nancy. Either her physician failed to diagnose the illness or
failed to warn the mother that the illness could result in the
birth of a defective child. Faced with a similar situation, the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,63 denied
recovery because the defendant did not cause the infant-
plaintiff's condition, and more importantly, because no dam-
ages were cognizable at law: "The infant plaintiff would have
us measure the difference between his life with defects against
the utter void of non-existence, but it is impossible to make
such a determination."'64 Most other states have followed the
Gleitman reasoning.6
Becker v. Schwartz6 is typical of the second subclass of
cases. In this instance, a 37-year-old woman conceived a child
but was not informed that a woman of her age might bear a
Down's syndrome child, nor was she advised to have an am-
niocentesis test performed. The child was in fact born with
Down's syndrome but the New York court denied recovery for
her wrongful life claim, reasoning that no recognized cause of
61. 31 Cal. 3d at 222, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
62. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 (1981), rev'd, 31 Cal. 3d
220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
63. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
64. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
65. See, e.g., Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 351, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981).
66. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
1983]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
action had been stated."7
In Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital,"
after the parents learned that they were carriers of Tay-Sachs
disease, amniocentesis was performed and the defendants as-
sured the parents that the test results revealed no trace of the
illness. Their son, however, was born with Tay-Sachs disease.
In denying recovery to the infant-plaintiff, the court followed
the Gleitman "impossibility of measuring damages"
argument. 9
In summary, the following arguments have been used by
courts to justify denying the infant's wrongful life action: (1)
the impossibility of measuring damages; (2) the public policy
restriction; (3) the lack of an ascertainable standard to decide
which injuries would entitle the plaintiff to relief; and (4) the
legislature as arbiter of wrongful life as a permissible cause of
action. Ways in which these arguments might be overcome
will be discussed in the remainder of this comment.
V. THE DAMAGES QUESTION
In order to understand the majority rule that the infant-
plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, a brief analysis of a tort cause of action is necessary.
As indicated earlier, a physician owes a duty of care to the
unborn child, and as the Curlender opinion noted, no author-
ity has "suggested that public policy considerations negate the
existence of such a duty."70 The plaintiff must then show that
the defendant breached the duty owed him; such breach of
duty is a factual determination and examples of that breach
are evident throughout the discussion of the wrongful life
cases.
The infant-plaintiff may prove causation by showing that
"but for" the defendant's failure to exercise due care he would
not have been born because had his parents been informed of
the risks involved, they would not have conceived him or they
would have terminated the pregnancy. It is, therefore, neces-
sary for the child to show that the parents sought advice7 ' and
67. Id. at 401, 386 N.E.2d at 812.
68. 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
69. Id.
70. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
71. The Curlender court noted that the parents' failure to avail themselves of
genetic testing, amniocentesis, or abortion would be an intervening cause relieving the
[Vol. 23858
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relied on the defendant's negligent information, but the very
fact that the parents took steps to ascertain whether the child
would be severely handicapped may be sufficient."
Finally, the defendant's negligence must have resulted in
actual injury to the plaintiff. In a wrongful life claim, "[t]he
injury, of course, is not the particular defect with which a
plaintiff is afflicted-considered in the abstract-but it is the
birth of plaintiff with such defect. '73
Although the infant-plaintiff in a wrongful life action has
satisfied the requirements of a tort cause of action, most
courts have denied recovery because damages cannot be ascer-
tained. The usual measure of damages is the monetary
amount necessary to place the victim in the position he would
have occupied had he not suffered the injury. The majority of
courts reason that since the plaintiff would not have existed
were it not for the defendant's negligence, courts cannot place
a dollar value on the position of non-existence.
The theory that any tort victim can ever be restored to
his pre-injury position is a fiction. The application of this
fiction to the wrongful life claim is unjust and subverts the
principles of tort law which are aimed at ensuring that one
who wrongfully inflicts injury upon another is held responsible
for redressing that injury. By constructing this obstacle the
court is, in effect, condoning the actions of the wrongdoer.
Some commentators believe that the appropriate measure
of damages should be the cost of supporting a defective exis-
tence in comparison to the cost of no existence, rather than
trying to place a value on non-existence itself.74 The
Curlender court recognized that the child has rights, including
the right to seek a remedy for his injuries, 7 and applied stan-
physician of liability. It further stated that the child in this situation might seek
recovery from his parents. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. The legisla-
ture responded to this declaration by passing Civil Code § 43.6 which provides, in
part: "(a) No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim
that the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been
allowed to have been born." CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982). See also Tedeschi, On
Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life," 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966), for a thorough dis-
cussion of this cause of action.
72. 106 Cal. App. at 816-17, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81. In Curlender, the plaintiff
did not assert that her parents had relied on the results of the genetic tests in decid-
ing to conceive her, but the court ruled in her favor regardless. Id.
73. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 828-29, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
74. Peters & Peters, supra note 2, at 865.
75. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89.
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dard tort principles in granting the plaintiff damages. The
court did not consider it necessary to grapple with the prob-
lem of measuring the value of non-existence and did not be-
lieve that this dilemma sufficiently justified the denial of re-
covery: "Although we recognize exceptions from these
fundamental principles [of tort law], no departure should be
sanctioned unless there is a strong necessity therefor. ' 76
Curlender limited recovery to the pain and suffering that
the child would endure during its limited life expectancy,
rather than measure recovery against the life expectancy of a
normal child." Because the parents had initiated a wrongful
birth action, the court abstained from awarding damages for
the cost of the infant's care and held that these costs were
recoverable by the parents or the child, but not both. Finally,
the court permitted the infant-plaintiff to seek punitive dam-
ages if she could prove "oppression, fraud, or malice, express
or implied. '7 8
The Turpin court, however, disagreed with the Curlender
rationale for assessing damages. In Turpin, the infant-plain-
tiff was awarded extraordinary medical expenses only, and her
claim for pain and suffering and other general damages was
denied. 79 The court's decision was based on the argument that
it is impossible to measure the value of non-existence.80 By
assenting to this argument, the court tacitly rejected
Curlender's application of standard tort principles to the
wrongful life claim."'
Although the Turpin decision is significant because it is
the first time that a wrongful life cause of action was recog-
nized by a state supreme court, it does not resolve the prob-
lem of assessing damages. In fact, it obfuscates the question
by introducing the "benefit doctrine," which provides that to
the extent the plaintiff has received a benefit as a result of the
76. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (quoting Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.
2d 425, 433, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18, 426 P.2d 173, 178 (1967)).
77. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
78. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (citing CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West 1970)).
79. 31 Cal. 3d at 232, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
80. Id. at 230, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47.
81. See id. at 229, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44. The court criticized
the Curlender decision for failing to distinguish between actions arising from pre-
natal injuries (see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text) and wrongful life
actions.
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injury inflicted, damages should be mitigated.2 The benefit
conferred on Joy Turpin, according to the court, was "a physi-
cal existence with the capacity both to receive and give love
and pleasure as well as to experience pain and suffering."83
Because plaintiff's pain and suffering were outweighed by the
benefit received, she was not entitled to general damages.
However, the task of determining to what degree the child
gives and receives love and pleasure, and offsetting that
against the harm inflicted, appears to be as difficult a task as
measuring the difference in value of existence versus non-exis-
tence, which the Turpin court declared impossible.
The reasoning of the Curlender court is more cogent:
Damages for pain and suffering are recoverable; damages for
extraordinary medical expenses may be awarded unless these
have been granted to the parents in their wrongful birth
claim. Courts possess the ability to fashion a remedy if it can
be shown that an injury has been negligently inflicted upon an
innocent victim,85 and the majority of courts' reluctance to do
so indicates that other reasons may exist to deny the wrongful
life claim. These concerns will be addressed infra.
VI. THE MORAL DILEMMA
Those courts that have refused to recognize a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful life have relied on public policy reasons. The
scope of public policy is unclear but in the wrongful life de-
bate it seems to include (1) a fear that recognition of this
cause of action will open up a Pandora's box of claims; (2) the
belief that this is an area best left to the legislature to decide;
and (3) the hesitancy of courts to make any statement which
might be construed as a denial of the sanctity of human life.
The argument that recognition of the wrongful life claim
will result in too many new claims is easily countered. Wrong-
ful life actions are normally brought with the parents' cause of
action for wrongful birth. Both actions involve the same set of
facts, present similar issues, and ask for similar damages so
both actions may be resolved at the same time. For example,
in a case which involves negligent genetic counseling, the par-
82. 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
85. Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
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ents will normally make the following assertions: (1) That
they underwent genetic testing to insure that, if they con-
ceived a child, he would not be born defective; (2) that in reli-
ance upon the results of those tests the parents conceived a
child who was ultimately born with the very defect they
feared they would pass on to him; (3) that if the tests had
been properly performed, the genetic defect would have been
discovered and they would never have conceived the child;
and (4) that because the defendant is, in effect, responsible
for the birth of a defective child, they seek damages for the
medical expenses, the mother's lost wages during pregnancy
and childbirth, and the parents' pain and suffering.
In the wrongful life claim the infant-plaintiff recites the
same facts as his parents and states that, had the genetic tests
been performed properly, he would not have been born into a
life of suffering and disability. The child asks for damages
consisting of medical expenses, the costs of supporting a de-
fective condition, and the pain and suffering to which he will
be subjected during his life. Since the wrongful birth and life
actions may be brought at the same time, the court can ensure
that there is no duplication of awards.
Moreover, the wrongful life action is only available to a
limited class of plaintiffs-defective children86 whose par-
ent(s) underwent amniocentesis, or genetic counseling, or who
contracted an illness during pregnancy which was not prop-
erly diagnosed. The awesome spectre of thousands of infant-
plaintiffs banging on the courthouse door seeking to recover
for their wrongful lives is unlikely to become a reality. Even if
recognition of this cause of action resulted in countless other
claims, this is not sufficient reason to close the doors to in-
jured parties. Courts have a duty to remedy harms negligently
inflicted, but they have have no obligation to limit the num-
ber of legitimate claims which they may hear."'
The second public policy argument employed by courts to
deny infant-plaintiffs recovery is that this area requires the
legislature to speak before the judiciary acts. This "passing
86. Note that if the child is born healthy but unwanted, courts may allow recov-
ery for wrongful birth but no recovery is allowed for wrongful life. See supra notes
30-33 and accompanying text. See also Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1976).
87. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980).
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the buck" is an attempt by courts to avoid their primary func-
tion of interpreting the law, and suggests that courts do not
wish to accept the responsibility for deciding a controversial
issue, one which may subject them to criticism. In California,
the legislature has spoken: "Every person who suffers detri-
ment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may re-
cover from the person in fault a compensation thereof in
money, which is called damages." ' The fact that there are few
precedents in this area should not cause the courts to run to
the legislature for protection because by doing so the courts
only provide protection to the tortfeasor 9
The final public policy argument is a moral and philo-
sophical one which revolves around a debate over the quality
and sanctity of human life.90 Because human life is a precious
commodity, it is understandable that the judiciary is hesitant
to declare that no life is better than a defective life. By recog-
nizing this cause of action and granting that a life can be
wrongful, the courts may be treading into territory where they
do not belong. One court expressed this hesitancy as follows:
[W]hether it is better never to have been born at all than
to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mys-
tery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the
theologians. Surely the law can assert no competence to
resolve the issue, particularly in view of the very nearly
uniform high value which the law and mankind has
placed on human life, rather than its absence. 1
According to one author, the courts' focus on the philo-
sophical and moral question is misguided and the courts
should shift their attention to the relationship between law
and fairness.9 2 With this perspective the court would ask
88. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3281 (Deering 1981).
89. In the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), the question
of whether the court should permit a child, injured by a physician during childbirth,
to recover from the tortfeasor was addressed. In deciding for the child, the court
stated, "It]he absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those who by their
wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded the right of an individual . Id. at
142.
90. In discussing the Gleitman decision, the Curlender court stated: "Any deci-
sion negating the value of life directly or by implication was seen by the majority in
Gleitman as an impermissible expression of public policy." 106 Cal. App. 3d at 819,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
91. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1978).
92. Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to the
"Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 585-87 (1973).
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whether it is just to compensate the child who has been in-
jured by being born into a life of suffering, rather than asking
whether it is contrary to moral and philosophical precepts to
state that no life is better than any life. By looking at the
question from a fairness viewpoint, courts may be able to free
themselves from the metaphysical quagmire in which they
find themselves.
Curlender viewed the sanctity of human life argument
from a different perspective. The court did not focus on the
fact that but for the defendant's negligence the child would
not have been born, but stated that a true reverence for
human life requires the courts to provide every life with the
opportunity to seek a remedy for the wrong it has suffered. e3
Another aspect of the moral dilemma is that courts are
reluctant to set standards for evaluating a less than perfect
life. Courts do not want to be placed in the position of decid-
ing the severity of the defect in order to grant recovery:
[I]f one is not born perfect, what condition less than per-
fect will be recognized as cognizable injury or defect? It is
obviously a question of degree as all human beings have
some imperfections. Would partial deafness in one ear or
poor vision qualify? Will crossed or cocked eyes, a large,
uncorrectable, disfiguring, discolored, facial birthmark or
a cleft palate be so recognized? What about an albino?94
In response to this argument, the defect must be one
which could have been discovered and attempts made by the
parents and physicians to discover it. There are some condi-
tions which can be corrected: Poor vision can be remedied
with eyeglasses, partial deafness with a hearing aid, and
speech problems with therapy. There are other conditions for
which there is no cure: Tay-Sachs disease, Down's syndrome,
and total hereditary deafness. A possible standard for the
courts to apply would be to award damages to plaintiffs who
suffer from disabilities the effects of which cannot be amelio-
rated. Another approach to the standard of defect problem is
available if courts decline to establish criteria and allow the
jury to resolve the issue.9
By using public policy as a shield to prevent the infant-
93. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
94. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
95. Peters & Peters, supra note 2, at 867.
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plaintiff from asserting his claims, the judiciary is not ad-
dressing the issues presented by technical and medical ad-
vances. "Put in another way, the law, equity and justice must
not themselves quail and be helpless in the face of modern
technological marvels presenting questions hitherto unthought
of."" Technology will always present difficult moral questions
and courts must be prepared to assist society in resolving
these questions.
In the context of wrongful life the courts must recognize
that recent advances make it possible to prevent the birth of a
defective child. When these advances fail or are negligently
administered, tragic results may occur. The law must expand
in order to provide a remedy for the person who suffers the
consequences. Rather than protecting the wrongdoers, the
courts should explicity inform them of their liability, so that
the wrongdoers will exercise more caution, resulting in fewer
mistakes.
VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has contrasted wrongful birth with
wrongful life in an effort to show that the very arguments
which inhibited the former tort action's growth, but are gener-
ally dismissed today, continue to be applied to the wrongful
life controversy. The argument voicing a concern over the
ability to measure damages is more of a pretext for avoiding a
difficult question than of loyalty to the principles of tort law.
The attempt by courts to encourage the legislature to address
the question reflects a fear of criticism should the public mis-
interpret the judiciary's reasoning. The courts need not try to
establish a criteria for the severity of the defect which would
entitle the infant-plaintiff to damages. Instead, with minimum
guidance from the bench, the jury is capable of deciding this
question. The philosophical barriers to the wrongful life claim
are actually semantic ones. The courts should articulate the
issue in terms of recompensing an injured victim, rather than
in terms of life versus non-life. With this perspective the
courts can focus on the issue as a tort problem and free them-
selves from the debate over the quality of human life.
Camilla D. Cochran
96. In the Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 665 (1976).
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